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Abstract
The WTO has become the chosen forum for various trade-related additional policies and pro-
visions such as Trade Related Environmental Measures (‘TREMS‘), TRIMS, TRIPS, and possibly
in the future, competition and investment rules. The TRIPS, as is well known, owes its existence
to trade-offs with DCs, which have still not been fully implemented. Future additional policies, if
controversial, would need to be justified separately on economic grounds, or risk failure. Detailed
multilateral competition rules will undoubtedly be adopted one day. I believe, however, that the
time is not yet ripe for a comprehensive agreement, except perhaps on the most abstract of princi-
ples. In the meantime, it will be due to the very processes of regionalization and globalization that
enterprises will increasingly be subject to national competition laws.
FROM WORLD TRADE LAW TO WORLD
COMPETITION LAW
Prof. Friedl Weiss*
INTRODUCTION
I have approached this ubiquitous subject with considerable
trepidation, looking up at mountains of scientific as well as pop-
ular literature on the subject and staring down into the abyss of
my own ignorance.
But I think that I also have good news. First, I feel suffi-
ciently uninhibited and unbiased to chance a fresh look at some
relevant contemporary developments, without being instantly
trapped by any currently fashionable discourse, let alone ideo-
logical or religious wars, past or present. In any case, in choos-
ing a painful but prudent place on the fence, as it were, I have, I
hope, discarded facile opining out of deference to the daunting
and multi-layered complexity of the subject assigned to me. An-
other positive factor is my trust in the experts here present who
would undoubtedly prevent me from re-inventing the wheel, any
wheel.
To place the discussion in its inevitably broader contextual
habitat I would like to recall Klaus Hopt's memorable phrase
that Wettbewerb ist eine staatliche Veranstaltung (competition is a
state event).' The same can be said of the so-called "competition
culture," whatever that might mean. It is a national culture, or
at best a regional one. Indeed, state-centered thinking has dom-
inated Western political philosophy of international relations
since the sixteenth century, which recorded the creation, rise to
near absolute levels, and then relative decline of state power.
The demise of national boundaries, however, and of nation
states as artificial, as advocated and predicted by the nineteenth
century laissez-faire and Marxist ideologies, respectively,2 ap-
pears still premature today and a long way off.'
* Professor of Law, Europa Institute, University of Amsterdam.
1. KLAUS J. HopT, WETBEWERBSBESCHRANKUNGEN UND VERRECHTLICHUNG 229, 287
(Von Friedrich Kfibler ed., 1985).
2. In Karl Marx's hegelian dialectic, states oppress the masses of impoverished,
destitute workers, and the liberal free market philosophy is a potentially disruptive
agent in society.
3. DAVID ARMSTRONG, REVOLUTION AND WORLD ORDER: THE REVOLUTIONARY STATE
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Worldwide debates about the nature of the unfolding post-
Cold War world, especially regarding the international politics of
economic development and the environment, comprise at least
three strands. One strand concerns the future role of nation
states; a second, the related role of various non-state actors, par-
ticularly corporations and non-governmental organizations
("NGOs"); and a third, the foundations, common values, rules,
and institutions of a civilized international polity.
As to the first, there are certain processes of disintegration
within 4 and between resurgent nation states,5 possibly com-
pounded by forms of international deregulation such as the re-
assertion of "subsidiarity" in relations between states and supra-
national institutions6 and by restrictions on the independent
role of international organizations.7 Interpretations of these
IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 301-02 (1993). For an interesting discussion of the elements
of diversity in the traditional state system, see Christoph Schreuer, The Waning of the
Sovereign State: Towards a New Paradigm for International Law?, 4 EUR. J. INT'L L. 447
(1993).
4. Examples include the division of Czechoslovakia into two separate independent
states, and different forms of regionalism in Western Europe, e.g., in Belgium, Spain,
and Italy.
5. Note the failure and break-up of multicultural and multiethnic federations, e.g.,
Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union.
6. Treaty establishing the European Community, Feb. 7, 1992, art. 3b, O.J. C 224/
1, at 9 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 573, 590 [hereinafter EC Treaty], incorporating changes
made by Treaty on European Union, Feb 7, 1992, O.J. C 224/1 (1992), [1992] 1
C.M.L.R. 719 [hereinafter TEU]. The Treaty on European Union ("TEU") amended
the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter EEC Treaty], as amended by Single European Act, O.J. L 169/1
(1987), [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741 [hereinafter SEA]. The principle of "subsidiarity" was
already implicit in the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community
("ECSC Treaty") and the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community
("EEC Treaty"). Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, Apr. 18,
1951, art. 5, 261 U.N.T.S. 140, 149 [hereinafter ECSC Treaty]; EEC Treaty, supra, art.
235, at 91. Regarding the EEC Treaty, one may cite the instrument of the directive,
which is binding as to the result to be achieved, but leaves the choice of form and
methods to national authorities. Id. The principle was, however, given explicit formu-
lation at first in the Single European Act ("SEA") in connection with European Eco-
nomic Community action relating to the environment. SEA, supra, art. 130r(4), O.J. L
169/1, at 12 (1987), [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. at 755.
7. U.N. actions in the Persian Gulf, Somalia, and former Yugoslavia were appar-
ently driven more by the interest of certain powers, or the absence thereof, rather than
by the collective will of the U.N. pursuant to principle and law. The General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT'), under the sway of the consensus principle, has
labored for seven years to complete the Uruguay Round of negotiations; the Confer-
ence on Security and Cooperation in Europe ("CSCE") has likewise enjoyed only mod-
est success.
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processes vary. Some commentators point to the spectacular rec-
ord of failure of states in providing peace and security for their
populations and in preventing the degradation of their social en-
vironments and the dereliction of natural habitats. Others
stress, more generally, their character as repositories of poten-
tially oppressive regulatory power or simply their incompetence
in regard to achieving stated goals, especially those promoting
development and satisfactory standards of living for the masses,
i.e., to implement the peoples' right to development.8
The second strand, the participation of non-state actors in
international decision-making, is, of course, closely linked to
that of the role of states. Among them, corporate business deci-
sions will, for better or worse,9 decisively influence the shape and
socioeconomic content of the global economy, including sus-
tainable development."0
The third strand, debates on values, rules, and institutions,
appears distinctly non-radical. It may be called a third liberal
revival, consisting of attempts to re-equip and reconstruct liber-
alism within its existing edifice of philosophical foundations and
property relationships. This revival is to be achieved by superim-
posing some kind of scientific-managerial role for the state.
That role is to be exercised pursuant to an ostensibly ideologi-
cally neutral scientific logic of intervention in order to protect
an emerging new balance between ecological interdependence
and political independence, between market and communitar-
ian or collective views, and indeed between environmental con-
cerns and economic development and trade objectives. 1 In
short, whatever their shortcomings, states are but instruments
8. ADAM SwiFr, GLOBAL POLITICAL ECOLOGY. THE CRISIS IN ECONOMY AND GOVERN-
MENT 67 (1993).
9. Stephan Schmidheiny, The Business of Sustainable Development, FIN. & DEv., Dec.
1992, at 24.
10. See U.N. CENTRE ON TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, ENVIRONMENTAL SERIES
No. 2: TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS IN WORLD DEVELOPMENT, U.N. Doc. ST/CTC/89,
U.N. Sales No. E.88.II.A.7 (1988); U.N. CENTRE ON TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, EN-
VIRONMENTAL SERIES No. 2: CLIMATE CHANGE AND TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, U.N.
Doc. ST/CTC/112, U.N. Sales No. E.92.II.A.7 (1992); U.N. CENTRE ON TRANSNATIONAL
CORPORATIONS, ENVIRONMENTAL SERIES No. 4: ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT IN TRANS-
NATIONAL CORPORATIONS: REPORT ON THE BENCHMARK CORPORATE ENVIRONMENTAL SUR-
VEY, U.N. Doc. ST/CTC/149, U.N. Sales No. E.94.II.A.2 (1993).
11. A "second revival," in response to the rise of totalitarianism, was based on the
works of Keynes (reconstruction of economics), Schumpeter (reformulation of demo-
cratic theory), Mannheim (program for the social sciences), and Popper (logic of scien-
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for the achievement of communal goals and objectives, and for
the provision of various other public goods, including regulatory
frameworks containing rules of the game to steer, guide, or en-
force socioeconomically desirable conduct by market partici-
pants.
Paradoxically, far reaching trade liberalization, deregula-
tion, and globalization-and the resulting relative decline of
state power to influence or steer national economic develop-
ment-have spurned efforts to seek multilateral standard setting
or at least greater approximation or harmonization in domestic
practices regarding the principles, law, and policy, both substan-
tive and procedural, governing trade and competition in Europe
as well as worldwide.
I. SINGAPORE ET APRES
A. Working Group on the Interaction Between Trade and
Competition Policy
At the Singapore Ministerial Conference, a declaration
("Singapore Ministerial Declaration") was made that established
a Working Group on the Interaction Between Trade and Com-
petition Policy ("Working Group"). The Working Group's man-
date was to study issues raised by World Trade Organization
("WTO") Members relating to the interaction between trade and
competition policy, including anti-competitive practices, in or-
der to identify any areas that might merit further consideration.
The Singapore Ministerial Declaration also stipulated that the
Working Group should have regard for the existing WTO provi-
sions in this area, including those under the Agreement on
Trade-Related Investment Measures 12 ("TRIMS"), and should
ensure that the development dimension is taken fully into ac-
count.
The establishment of the Working Group was welcomed, in-
ter alia, by the European Community (or "EC") and its Member
States both taking the following positions:
tific discovery). See 1 KEYNES PUBLIC POLICY AFTER FIFTY YEARS: ECONOMICS AND POLICY
15 (Omar F. Hamouda & John N. Smithin eds., 1988).
12. Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, art. 9, Apr. 15, 1994, Mar-
rakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization [hereinafter WTO
Agreement], Annex IA (visited on Aug. 24, 1999) <http://www.wto.org/wto/legal/
finalact.htm> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal) [hereinafter TRIMS].
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" There is a role for the WTO to encourage its Members,
irrespective of their level of development, to enact and
effectively apply a domestic competition law.
* The WTO could identify core principles common to com-
petition laws of different Members, if any.
" The WTO could examine how effectiveness and coher-
ence of national competition policies of different Mem-
bers, as well as cooperation between national competition
authorities, could best be enhanced.
" Work in the WTO could contribute to the avoidance of
conflicts of law and jurisdiction between Members and to
the promotion of gradual convergence of competition
laws, thereby increasing the legal security of firms operat-
ing in different jurisdictions, as well as reducing their
costs of compliance with competition laws.
* The WTO could explore the scope for a future consensus
on the adoption of certain common binding principles of
competition law and procedure, and examine whether
the WTO approach to competition policy might be global
to all sectors-goods, services, and public undertakings-
or rather sectoral.
B. Interaction Between Trade and Competition Policy
This juxtaposition of competition and trade policy does not
necessarily amount to a stable relationship. While competition
policy focuses primarily on the goals of efficiency and consumer
welfare, trade policy often seeks to protect the interests of a
country's individual producers.
Over the last fifty years, the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade1" ("GATT") has led to an effective reduction of gov-
ernmental barriers to trade. Tariff and non-tariff barriers as well
as regulatory obstacles have been either reduced or eliminated.
In contrast, while the benefits of rules for business behavior are
generally recognized, none have as yet been developed at the
international level. Trade liberalization and globalization of
business activities, however, also resulted in concomitant global-
ization of anti-competitive practices. More and more countries,
consequently, have come to adopt national competition policies
13. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, A-23-25,
A-52-53, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, 212-16, 250-51 [hereinafter GATT].
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so as to prevent the fruits of governmental trade liberalization
and deregulation from being nullified by the establishment of
barriers set up by business having the same effect.14 Thus, na-
tional competition laws may effectively tackle anti-competitive
practices that are exclusively implemented on a domestic mar-
ket, but are carried out by firms operating from third countries.
But national competition laws and law enforcement institutions,
especially those of developing countries ("DCs"), are not always
fully equipped to deal with transboundary anti-competitive prac-
tices.
This situation prompted the United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development ("UNCTAD") to adopt a comprehen-
sive code on restrictive business practices on December 5,
1980.15 Known as the U.N. Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equita-
ble Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business
Practices ("Set"), it is hitherto the sole fully multilateral instru-
ment in this field. Its primary objective is to ensure that restric-
tive business practices ("RBPs") do not impede or negate the re-
alization of benefits that should arise from the liberalization of
tariff and non-tariff barriers affecting world trade, particularly
those affecting the trade of DCs. The Set is universally applica-
ble to all enterprises, all countries, all regional groupings, and
all transactions in goods and services, but is voluntary in na-
ture.16 It has been suggested in this respect that the WTO could,
in many ways, take this initiative further, for instance, by examin-
ing how best to build upon the Set, by adding binding elements
14. Horst G. Krenzler, Globalisation and Multilateral Rules, 4 Ir'L TRADE L. & REG.
144, 149 (1998). Some 70 countries have introduced antitrust laws; some 35 developing
countries have introduced competition laws since 1990. Id.
15. U.N. CONFERENCE ON RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES, U.N. SET OF MULTILAT-
ERALLY AGREED EQUITABLE PRINCIPLES AND RULES FOR THE CONTROL OF RESTRICTIVE Busi-
NESS PRACTICES at 1, U.N. Doc. TD/RBP/CONF/10, U.N. Sales No. E.81.II.D.5 (1980).
The Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of Re-
strictive Business Practices (the "Set") was adopted by a resolution of the U.N. General
Assembly on December 5,1980. See G.A. Res. 35/63, U.N. GAOR, 35th Sess., Supp. No.
48, at 123, U.N. Doc. A/35/48 (1980); see also Joel Davidow, The UNCTAD Restrictive
Business Practices Code, in 1 LEGAL PROBLEMS OF CODES OF CONDUCT FOR MULTINATIONAL
ENTERPRISES 193 (Norbert Horn ed., 1980).
16. The Third U.N. Review Conference held in November 1995 affirmed the fun-
damental role of competition law and policy, and recommended to the General Assem-
bly to convene a fourth such Conference under U.N. Conference on Trade and Devel-
opment ("UNCTAD") auspices in the year 2000.
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to agreed principles and by considering new issues such as inter-
national cooperation.
1. Interdependence I: Convergence
There appears to be agreement on at least two points. The
first is that trade liberalization and competition policy share
broadly similar goals, are interrelated, and are partially overlap-
ping. The second is that both affect access to markets by seeking
greater efficiency in the production and allocation of goods and
services through the removal of barriers to the competitive pro-
cess. Indeed, the common goal of market access represents an
important confluence between trade and competition policy.
While the removal of external governmental trade barriers facili-
tates market entry, the control of anti-competitive conduct by
market operators opens access to competitive markets. In com-
bination, potential welfare gains derived from comparative ad-
vantage are made safe against anti-competitive erosion.
This common goal of market access also coincides with the
central function of the WTO, which is to ensure equality of com-
petitive opportunities for Members in the world trading system.
As was noted by the GATT Oilseeds panel, "the CONTRACTING
PARTIES have consistently interpreted the basic provisions of
the General Agreement on restrictive trade measures as provi-
sions establishing conditions of competition."17
This established GATT panel practice illustrates the interde-
pendence of trade and competition policy. Both are comple-
mentary in the sense of being mutually supportive, so that
neither could fully achieve its objectives without the other. Such
interdependence, however, is multi-faceted and includes ele-
ments of both conflict and convergence. Furthermore, a per-
ception of interdependence should not obscure the fact that the
application of existing trade instruments could be inconsistent
with the goals of competition policy. In fact, closer analysis of
that interdependence reveals three aspects. The first is one of
17. See European Economic Community-Payments and Subsidies Paid to Proces-
sors and Producers of Oilseeds and Related Animal-Feed Proteins, Jan. 25, 1990, GATT
B.I.S.D. (37th Supp.) at 86 (1991); see also United States-Section 337 of the Tariff Act
of 1930, Nov. 7, 1989, GATT B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) at 345 (1990). According to the
GATT panel report on Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, the first sentence in Article
111(2) protects "expectations on the competitive relationship between imported and
domestic products." United States-Section 337, supra, at 387, 5.13.
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complementarity, 1 8 an example of which would be the prohibition,
under competition law, of predatory practices that deter market
access after the elimination of the conventional trade barriers of
tariffs and quotas. The second is one of antagonism, an example
of which would be the application of anti-dumping measures
triggered by prices that were not actually harmful to competition
in the importing country. The third aspect is one of actual or
potential substitutability, where provisions of competition law re-
lating to price discrimination might in some instances serve as a
substitute for anti-dumping measures.
2. Interdependence II: Divergence
GATT/WTO law also differs in several ways from competi-
tion laws. While the latter typically covers at least potential re-
strictions relating to horizontal and vertical restraints, abuses of
a dominant position, and, increasingly, merger control, some of
the former aim to protect import-competing producers rather
than competition and consumer welfare. Thus, provisions on
safeguards, anti-dumping, and countervailing duties are notori-
ously used to restrict import competition without due regard to
the objectives of open markets, undistorted competition, and
consumer welfare. GATT/WTO law is also intergovernmental
law, notwithstanding persistent arguments by some untiring aca-
demic campaigners that many of its provisions appear to be di-
rectly applicable.19 By contrast, both national and some interna-
tional competition rules, such as those of the European Commu-
nity, have been interpreted as conferring directly applicable
rights upon producers, traders, and consumers and are enforce-
able through domestic courts. Furthermore, some regional ar-
rangements protect free trade and undistorted competition
through prohibitions of both governmental and private trade re-
strictions and competitive distortions.2 ° They have also replaced
18. P.K.M. Tharakan & P.J. Lloyd, Competition Policy in a Changing International Eco-
nomic Environment: An Overview, 21 WoRLD ECON. 997 (1998).
19. For critical reviews of that academic debate, see Thomas Cottier & Krista
Nadakavukaren Schefer, The Relationship Between World Trade Organization Law, National
and Regional Law, I J. INT'L ECON. L. 83 (1998), and Judson Osterhoudt Berkey, The
European Court ofJustice and Direct Effect for the GATT': A Question Worth Revisiting, 9 EUR.
J. INT'L L. 626 (1998).
20. EC Treaty, supra note 6, arts. 85-94, O.J. C 224/1, at 28-31 (1992), [1992] 1
C.M.L.R. at 626-32; North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992,
Can.-Mex.-U.S., arts. 1902-04, 32 I.L.M. 605, 682-84 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1994)
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their trade protection rules, such as anti-dumping rules, with
competition rules. GATF/WTO law, on the other hand, does
not require mutually consistent trade and competition rules and
includes only a few rules on private restraints. 21 Notwithstanding
these differences, the issue arises whether it necessarily follows
that the GATT/WTO approach is ineffective or obsolete.
C. Interaction Between Trade and Competition Policy:
The GATT/WTO Approach
1. Types of Approach
The issue of "stocktaking and analysis of existing instru-
ments, standards and activities regarding trade and competition
policy," on the Chairman of the Working Group's Checklist of
Issues Suggested for Study,2 2 comprised three topics: national
competition policies, laws, and instruments as they relate to
trade; bilateral, regional, plurilateral, and multilateral agree-
[hereinafter NAFrA]; Agreement on the European Economic Area of May 2, 1992,
arts. 53-60 & Protocol 21, O.J. L 1/3, 15-17, 181 (1994) [hereinafter EEA]; see Friedl
Weiss, The Oporto Agreement on the European Economic Area-A Legal Still Life, 12 Y.B. EUR.
L. 385, 415 (1992); Phedon Nicolaides, For a World Competition Authority: The Role of
Competition Policy in Economic Integration and the Role of Regional Blocs in Internationalizing
Competition Policy, 30 J. WORLD TRADE 131 (1996). For a discussion of the idea of a
Transatlantic Free Trade Area ("TAFTA") between the European Community and the
United States, see Jfirgen B. Donges, et al., TAFTA: Assuring its Compatibility with Global
Free Trade, 20 WORLD ECON. 567 (1997). TAFTA may be superseded by the EC Commis-
sion's Draft Action Plan for Transatlantic Economic Partnership ("TEP"), of September
1998. See Directorate General for Trade, Transatlantic Economic Partnership, Action
Plan, Nov. 9, 1998 (visited on Aug. 25, 1999) <http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg01/
1109tep.htm> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal); EU Foreign Ministers
Endorse EU-US Action Plan for Transatlantic Economic Partnership, Commission Press
Release, IP/98/974 (Nov. 9, 1998); see also European Parliament Resolution on the
Transatlantic Economic Partnership between the European Union and the United
States, O.J. C 379/94 (1998). For principled opposition to such plans, see Brian Hind-
ley, New Institutions for Transatlantic Trade?, 75 INT'L ArrAiRs 45 (1999).
21. GATT, supra note 13, arts. VI, XVII; General Agreement on Trade in Services,
arts. 8, 9, in Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, reprinted in LEGAL INSTRUMENTs-RESULTS OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31; 33 I.L.M. 44, 54-55 (1994) [hereinafter GATS]; Agreement on
Telecommunications Services (Fourth Protocol to the General Agreement on Trade in
Services), Feb. 15, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 354 (1997) [hereinafter Telecommunications Serv-
ices Agreement]; Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Apr. 15, 1994, art. 40, WTO Agreement, supra note 12, Annex IC, reprinted in LEGAL
INSTRUMENTs-RESuLTS OF THE URUGUAY RouND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81, 98-99 (1994)
[hereinafter TRIPS].
22. WTO Secretariat, Working Group on the Interaction Between Trade and Competition
Policy: 1997 Report to the General Council, WT/WGTCP/1, Annex 1 (Nov. 28, 1997).
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ments and initiatives, and existing WTO provisions.
2. Antecedent Approaches
Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann demonstrated that early state prac-
tice dealing with international competition problems followed
different approaches. 24 One is the intellectual property law ap-
proach, as laid down in the 1883 Paris Convention on the Protec-
tion of Industrial Property, which merely envisaged "effective
protection against unfair competition,"2' but did not attempt to
protect freedom of competition and consumer welfare-for in-
stance against market segmentation through patents. Another
approach, the competition policy approach, is evident in the extra-
territorial application of domestic competition law to anti-com-
petitive practices abroad, as in the EC and the United States, and
in non-binding multilateral guidelines like the Set and the Or-
ganization for Economic Co-operation and Development
("OECD") Council Recommendation Concerning Restrictive
Business Practices Affecting International Trade,26 and a
number of bilateral agreements for the coordination of domes-
tic competition laws. This approach must be considered flawed
for at least two reasons. First, many domestic competition laws
exempt export/import cartels as well as governmental restraints
of competition. Second, differences between national competi-
tion laws27 and their extraterritorial application have given rise
to international conflict, including blocking statutes. A third ap-
proach, the regional integration law approach, seeks to protect in-
ternational market integration and cross-border transactions
against both governmental barriers to market access-public un-
dertakings, enterprises with privileged status-and private re-
strictive practices distorting trade-trade restricting patent mis-
23. Id.
24. ERNs--ULRICH PETERSMANN, THE NEED FOR INTEGRATING TRADE AND COMPETI-
TION RULES IN THE WTO WORLD TRADE AND LEGAL SYsTEM 7, Occasional Paper (The
Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, WTO Series No. 3, (1996).
25. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, as
revised at Stockholm, July 14, 1967, art. 10 bis, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 1648, 828 U.N.T.S. 305,
337.
26. Council Recommendation Concerning Restrictive Business Practices Affecting
International Trade, O.E.C.D. Doc. C(86) 44 (Final),June 5, 1986, reprinted in 25 I.L.M.
1629 (1986).
27. These are mainly due to different views among economists on how competi-
tion works and how governmental regulation should approach conflicting interests be-
tween producers, traders, and consumers.
S2592000]
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use, anti-competitive licensing agreements. 28
Last, the world trade law, GATT/WTO approach seeks to en-
sure non-discriminatory market access to foreign markets
through the progressive liberalization of governmental barriers
to market access and by means of its inter-governmental system
for the settlement of disputes. So far the GATT/WTO approach
has been based upon the premise that in order to establish non-
discriminatory international conditions for competition, one
must first focus on and give priority to the liberalization of gov-
ernmental market access barriers and market distortions. After
fifty years of activity, it would appear that much unfinished busi-
ness remains to be done. While there is only scant empirical
evidence of the relative importance of private as opposed to gov-
ernmental market access barriers, 29 it would appear, nonethe-
less, that the latter constitute more important obstacles to fur-
ther growth of welfare through trade than the former, a view
shared by many DCs. Consequently, in its discussions of "inter-
action issues" between trade and competition policies, the Work-
ing Group has given priority to governmental market access bar-
riers and trade-related aspects thereof, rather than to country-
specific internal non-discriminatory competition policies that
differ from country to country without impairing the market ac-
cess commitments under WTO law. These trade-related provi-
sions and their antecedents in the Havana Charter for an Inter-
national Trade Organization" ("Havana Charter") will be sum-
marily reviewed in the next section.
28. The case for a regional approach to competition policy is made by Sanoussi
Bilal & Marcelo Olarreaga, Regionalism, Competition Policy and Abuse of Dominant Position,
32J. WORLD TRADE 153 (1998).
29. The members of a Group of Experts on Restrictive Business Practices ("Group
of Experts") "felt that sufficient evidence was not available to judge the extent of the
actual damage to world trade which results from these practices." Restrictive Business
Practices-Arrangements for Consultations, June 2, 1960, GATT B.I.S.D. (9th Supp.) at
170, 170-71, 4 (1961) [hereinafter Group of Experts Report].
30. Areas where governmental measures continue to be more serious impediments
to trade than purely private restrictive practices include: textiles, clothing, certain agri-
cultural products, and anti-dumping measures against competitive low-cost imports es-
pecially from newly industrializing economies. See, e.g. GATT, supra note 13, arts. VI,
XVI, XVII.
31. Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization, U.N. Conference on
Trade & Employment, Final Act and Related Documents, U.N. Doc. E/CONF. 2/78,
U.N. Sales No. II.D.4 (1948) [hereinafter Havana Charter].
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3. Antecedent World Trade Law Approach: Havana Charter
Article 46.1 of the Havana Charter's Chapter V on Restric-
tive Business Practices stipulated that:
[e]ach Member shall take appropriate measures and
shall co-operate with the Organization to prevent, on the part
of private or public commercial enterprises, business prac-
tices affecting international trade which restrain competition,
limit access to markets, or foster monopolistic control, when-
ever such practices have harmful effects on the expansion of
production or trade and interfere with the achievement of
any of the other objectives set forth in Article 1.32
Article 1 sets out a comprehensive program for, inter alia, prob-
lem solving in a number of trade-related fields.3" As is clear
from this provision, the object of protection is not trade liberali-
zation alone, but also a variety of trade-related socio-economic
objectives such as employment, economic development, com-
mercial policy, business practices, and commodity policy. This
provision, however, reflects a certain ambivalence. Neither com-
petition policies nor trade policies appear in an undiluted form.
Nonetheless, this approach accords with the practice of many
countries where competition policies pursue not only economic
objectives, such as the maximization of economic efficiency, but
also additional socio-political objectives, such as policies for
Small and Medium Size Enterprises ("SMEs") or strategic indus-
try support. Conversly, trade policies are not only aimed at trade
liberalization but also at other objectives, such as the prevention
of serious injury to domestic producers as reflected in the GATT
Safeguard's clause. 4
D. The GATT Connection
1. GATT Provisions
GATT rules appear to confirm this assessment. On the one
hand, these rules accord each contracting party the freedom to
32. Id. art. 46.
33. Id. art. 1.
34. See, however, para. 7(iii) of the Ministerial Declaration of 1982, according to
which contracting parties undertook "to abstain from taking restrictive trade measures,
for reasons of a non-economic character, not consistent with the [GATr]." Ministerial
Declaration, Nov. 29, 1982, GATr" B.I.S.D. (29th Supp.) at 9, 11, 7(iii) (1983).
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shape its own domestic regulations, 35 to decide on the level of
import tariffs,3 6 and to apply safeguard measures against injuri-
ous imports.3 7 On the other hand, these rules enable con-
tracting parties to protect various national public goods, e.g., im-
port-competing industries, against unemployment caused by
competitively priced imports. It follows that GATT rules recog-
nize the right and liberty of contracting parties to accord greater
importance to the protection of certain legitimate national pub-
lic goods or interests than to more liberal trade practice.
GATT contracting parties have explicitly recognized that
the "activities of international cartels and trusts may hamper the
expansion of world trade .. .and thereby frustrate the benefits
of tariff reductions and of removal of quantitative restrictions or
otherwise interfere with the objectives of the General Agree-
ment."3' Nevertheless, proposals made repeatedly between 1948
and 1986 for introducing into GATT law supplementary rules on
restrictive business practices, including a supranational body
with broad powers of investigation and control, were never
adopted by the GATT contracting parties.
2. Panel Practice
As was mentioned before, the GAT/WTO approach fo-
cuses on the progressive liberalization of governmental barriers
to market access and on the inter-governmental system of dis-
pute settlement. This is also confirmed by GATT panel practice.
Just as GATT and WTO law has always focused on governmental
market access barriers and market access distortions, GATT and
WTO dispute settlement procedures have been used almost ex-
clusively for reviewing governmental trade restrictions and dis-
tortions.
Although classification of GATT/WTO disputes according
to the type of trade measure targeted by a complaint is rarely
35. See GATT, supra note 13, art. III.
36. Id., arts. II, XXVIII.
37. Id., arts. VI, XIX, XX.
38. The Group of Experts reported on harmful restrictive business practices in
international trade and considered it "unrealistic to recommend at present a multilat-
eral agreement for the control of international restrictive business practices." Groups of
Experts Report, supra note 29, at 171, 7; see Extract from a Speech by Sir Leon Brittan
to the Centre for European Policy Studies: The Future of EC Competition Policy, Com-
mission Press Release, IP/92/1009 (Dec. 7, 1992).
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clear or easy, 9 it would seem, nonetheless, that private anti-com-
petitive business practices-with the alleged support of the gov-
ernment concerned-have only rarely been challenged. For ex-
ample, the 1988 Panel Report on Japan's export restrictions and
"voluntary imports expansion commitments," pursuant to the Ja-
pan-U.S. Semiconductor Agreement, described the close rela-
tionship between the private cartel of Japanese producers and
exporters of semiconductors and the supplementary governmen-
tal export restrictions.4 ° Yet, dismissing the European Economic
Community's non-violation complaint, the panel stated that "the
evidence submitted by the EEC relating to access to the Japanese
market did not permit it to identify any measure by the Japanese
Government that put EEC exporters of semi-conductors at a
competitive disadvantage vis-A-vis those of the United States
.... -1" Consequently, it only found the governmental export
restrictions to be inconsistent with Article XI:I of the GATT.4 2 A
decade later, the Kodak-Fuji Panel Report on Japan's measures
affecting consumer photographic films and paper painstakingly
illustrated the close relationships between governmental and pri-
vate market distortions, stating that WTO rules are applicable to
measures by private actors when there is a sufficient degree of
government involvement. 43 Yet, once again, it focused on the
governmental measures.44
II. THE WTO CONNECTION: CONTINUITY OR
ADDITIONAL DISCIPLINES?
A. Economics of Globalization
It has been said that in a globalized world economy, RBPs
39. See Robert E. Hudec et al., A Statistical Profile of GATT Dispute Settlement Cases,
1948-1989, 2 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1 (1993).
40. SeeJapan-Trade in Semiconductors, May 4,1988, GATT B.I.S.D. (35th Supp.)
at 116.
41. Id. at 162, 1 131.
42. Id. at 161-63, 131-32.
43. WTO Panel Report on Japan-Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic
Film and Paper, Mar. 31, 1998, WTO Doc. WT/DS44/R, at 385, 10.49 (visited on
Sept. 21, 1999) <http://www.wto.org/wto/dispute/distab.htm> (on file with the Ford-
ham International Law Journal).
44. Id.; Mark Furse, Japan-Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and Paper,
I EuR. COMPETrTON L. Ray. 9 (1999); Mark R_ Joelson, The Kodak-Fuji Trade Dispute: A
U.S. Vzew, INT'L TRADE L. & REG. 34-39 (1998); Norio Komuro, WTO Panel Ruling on the
Kodak-Fuji Film Case, INT'L. TRADE L. & REG. 136-43, 177-87 (1998).
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have assumed increasing importance as a source of distortion to
international trade and competition. There is mounting evi-
dence that these developments are being taken seriously. It is
perhaps for that reason that the 1997 Fourth Protocol to the
General Agreement on Trade in Services4" ("GATS"), on the
Liberalization of Telecommunications Services4 6 ("Telecommu-
nications Services Agreement"), includes commitments on mem-
bers' regulatory disciplines relating to such matters as competi-
tion safeguards, interconnection guarantees, licensing, and inde-
pendence of regulators.47 This pattern might obviously be seen
as a model for negotiations of future GATS protocols on the lib-
eralization of, for example, transport services. The need for
WTO rules on monopolies and anti-competitive practices has
also been raised in accession negotiations with some former
state-trading economies. However, before considering particu-
lar negotiations strategies-sectoral GATS protocols, economy-
specific accession protocols, additional general WTO rules, and
plurilateral trade agreements under Annex 4 to the WTO Agree-
ment-it is essential that the various trade-related competition
problems will be more clearly identified. In any event, the focus
should be on "interaction problems" of trade and competition
policies rather than on national competition policies and their
international coordination.
B. The New Look "WTO Approach"
The WTO approach differs from that of the GATT by its
much greater emphasis on broader and integrated market access
guarantees. As a result, the relative importance of private mar-
ket access barriers has increased. This approach is reflected in a
considerable number of WTO provisions, which may be divided
into two groups. There are those provisions that in fact deal
with private market access barriers, albeit somewhat perfuncto-
45. GATS, supra note 21.
46. Telecommunications Services Agreement, supra note 21.
47. Id.; see also WALDEMAR HUMMER & FRIEDL WEISS, DOKUMENTE ZUR ALTEN UND
ZUR NEUEN WELTHANDELSORDNUNG 1067 (1997); Paragraph 1.1 of an informal Refer-
ence Paper on regulatory disciplines refers to the "prevention of anti-competitive prac-
tices in telecommunications." Fourth Protocol to the General Agreement on Trade in Services:
Reference Paper, 36 I.L.M. 354, 367 1.1 (1997); see also Marco C.E.J. Bronckers & Pierre
Larouche, Telecommunications Services and the World Trade Organization, 31 J. WoRLD
TRADE 5 (1997); Colin D. Long, WFO Basic Telecommunications Agreement, 5 INr'L TRADE
L. & REG. 151-54 (1997).
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rily. In addition, there are provisions that mandatorily require
members to examine the competition policy aspects of other
trade provisions.
1. Provisions Addressing Aspects of RBPs
Almost all WTO agreements contain provisions dealing with
private market access barriers.4" For instance, several provisions
of the GATS address problems of RBPs. Most importantly, Arti-
cle VIII on Monopolies and Exclusive Service Suppliers requires
members to ensure that monopolies and exclusive service suppli-
ers do not operate in a manner inconsistent with their Most Fa-
vored Nation49 ("MFN") obligations and specific commitments
under the GATS.5° Members also recognize that certain other
business practices of service suppliers may restrain competition
and thereby restrict trade in services. 1 It may also be antici-
pated that the "specific commitments" on market access5 2 and
national treatment,53 in combination with the requirements of
MFN-treatment and reciprocity, may, over time, strengthen
claims to develop more general competition rules. Some such
rules are already contained in the Telecommunications Services
Agreement, 54 which includes a set of pro-competitive regulatory
principles. These principles relate to anti-competitive behavior,
interconnection, universal service, transparency of licensing cri-
teria, independence of the regulator, and allocation of scarce
resources and apply largely to monopoly service suppliers that
previously dominated this sector. These rules had to be incorpo-
rated in members' schedules as "additional commitments. 55
The Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property
Rights5 6 ("TRIPS") contains several examples of incomplete pro-
visions on RBPs. On the one hand, TRIPS does contain provi-
sions dealing with examples of "unfair trade '57 as well as anti-
48. See Maria-Chiara Malaguti, Restrictive Business Practices in International Trade and
the Role of the World Trade Organization, 32J. WORLD TRADE 117, 123 (1998).
49. See GATS, supra note 21, art. 2.
50. Id. art. 8.
51. Id. art. 9.
52. Id. art. 16.
53. Id. art. 17.
54. Telecommunications Services Agreement, supra note 21.
55. GATS, supra note 21, art. 18.
56. TRIPS, supra note 21.
57. Examples of these provisions include "fair use of descriptive terms" of a trade-
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trust rules combating restraints of competition, 58 in order to "en-
sure that measures and procedures to enforce intellectual
property rights do not themselves become barriers to legitimate
trade. ''59 On the other hand, some of its other provisions distin-
guishing "legitimate trade" from "abuse of intellectual property
rights"6' fail to provide effective tools against anti-competitive
practices. Here too, it is argued, there is ample scope for im-
provement so as to provide a more systematic set of principles on
the protection of competition between trade-related intellectual
property rights and on the prevention of their anti-competitive
abuse.6 1
A few relevant provisions are also to be found in the Agree-
ment on Government Procurement6 2 ("Procurement Agree-
ment") in particular those "to ensure optimum international
competition" and "equitable opportunities for suppliers or ser-
vice providers. ' 63 Reference is also made to problems caused by
certain anti-competitive practices such as "collusive tendering"6 4
and "absence of competition and to the challenge procedures
"enabling suppliers and service providers to challenge breaches
of the Procurement Agreement arising in the context of
procurements in which they have or have had, an interest. "66
Cognate references are also contained in the Agreement on
Implementation of Article VI of GATT 199467 and in the Agree-
mark, TRIPS, supra note 21, art. 17; "misleading" or "unfair" uses of geographical indi-
cations, id. arts. 22-24; and protection of undisclosed information "against unfair com-
mercial use." Id. art. 39.
58. See, e.g., id. art. 40 (describing methods to control anti-competitive practices in
contractual licenses).
59. Id. pmbl.
60. Id. art. 8. Article 8 was aimed at protecting the public interest against "the
abuse of intellectual property rights by right holders or the resort to practices which
unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the international transfer of technology."
Id. Article 31 on patent uses without authority of the right holder was designed to
correct anti-competitive practices." Id. art. 31(k).
61. Petersmann advocates international competition rules as part of an interna-
tional competition agreement applicable to the various World Trade Organization
("WTO") fields. See Petersmann, supra note 24, at 22.
62. Agreement on Government Procurement, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement,
supra note 12, Annex 4 (visited on Aug. 24, 1999) <http://www.wto.org/wto/legal/
finalact.htm> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal).
63. Id. art. 10.
64. Id. art. 15.
65. Id.
66. Id. art. 20.
67. Agreement on Article VI, Apr. 15, 1994, sect. III, 5, WTO Agreement, supra
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ment on Subsidies.68 The former identifies "trade restrictive
practices of and competition between the foreign and domestic
producers" as one of several factors in the determination of in-
jury.69 The latter makes detailed provisions on "market displace-
ment" and "price undercutting" in connection with the determi-
nation of serious prejudice caused by actionable subsidies, 70 and
on "satisfactory voluntary undertakings" by exporters apt to lead
to a termination of suspension of proceedings71 and again on
"trade restrictive practices of and competition between the for-
eign and domestic producers" as a factor in the determination of
injury. 72
The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade73 ("TBT")
provides detailed rules aiming to ensure that the preparation,
adoption, and application of technical regulations, standards,
and conformity assessment procedures by non-governmental
bodies are not more trade restrictive than necessary to fulfill le-
gitimate objectives. These objectives include national security
requirements, the prevention of deceptive practices, the protec-
tion of human health or safety, the protection of animal or plant
life and health, and the protection of the environment.7 4
The Agreement on Preshipment Inspection 75 contains rules
governing the activities of private pre-shipment entities in a non-
discriminatory manner.76
Lastly, the Agreement on Safeguards77 prohibits certain
note 12, Annex IA (visited on Aug. 24, 1999) <http://www.wto.org/wto/legal/
finalact.htm> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal) [hereinafter Anti-
Dumping Agreement].
68. Agreement on Subsidies, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, supra note 12, An-
nex IA (visited on Aug. 24, 1999) <http://www.wto.org/wto/legal/finalact.htm> (on
file with the Fordham International Law Journal) [hereinafter Agreement on Subsidies].
69. Anti-Dumping Agreement, supra note 67, art. 3.5.
70. Agreement on Subsidies, supra note 68, art. 6.3.
71. Id. art. 18.
72. Id. art. 15.
73. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, arts. 3, 4, 8, WTO
Agreement, supra note 12, Annex IA (visited on Aug. 24, 1999) <http://www.wto.org/
wto/legal/finalact.htm> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal) [hereinaf-
ter TBT].
74. Id.
75. Agreement on Preshipment Inspection, Apr. 15, 1994, art. 2, WTO Agreement,
supra note 12, Annex IA (visited on Aug. 24, 1999) <http://www.wto.org/wto/legal/
finalact.htm> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal).
76. Id.
77. Agreement on Safeguards, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, supra note 12, An-
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measures outright, namely "voluntary export restraints, orderly
marketing arrangements or any other similar measures on the
export or the import side. '7 8 Regarding others, it enjoins mem-
bers not to "encourage or support the adoption or maintenance
by public and private enterprises" of equivalent non-governmen-
tal measures.7 9
2. Provisions Mandating Further Review or Negotiation
Several WTO Agreements provide for review of their opera-
tion with a view to adding some competition rules. Thus, the
TRIMS mandates the Council for Trade in Goods, not later than
five years after its entry into force, to "consider whether it should
be complemented with provisions on investment policy and
competition policy."80 This provision, which was requested by
DCs, should make it possible to confront anti-competitive prac-
tices by multinational enterprises. Review is also envisaged by
the Agreement on Preshipment Inspection, possibly leading to
future negotiations on additional competition rules.8 1
The GATS, as has been shown, recognizes "that certain busi-
ness practices of service suppliers may restrain competition and
thereby restrict trade in services. "82 This provision may well give
rise to future negotiations on "specific commitments" regarding
the liberalization of such private RBPs, an issue that is also likely
to make or break future negotiations on Sectoral Agreements
on-for example, air and maritime transport services.
All the above mentioned provisions may appear feeble or
simply inadequate. Yet they also comprise dynamic elements
that may be activated if required. Admittedly, their intrinsic am-
biguities and weaknesses will continue to fuel demands for world
competition rules of some kind or another, be that in the form
of an agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Antitrust Meas-
ures8" ("TRAMS"), by some set of mandatory minimum competi-
nex IA (visited on Aug. 24, 1999) <http://www.wto.org/wto/legal/finalact.htm> (on
file with the Fordham International Law Journal).
78. Id. § 6, 22(b).
79. Id. § 6, 24.
80. TRIMS, supra note 12, art. 9.
81. Agreement on Preshipment Inspection, supra note 75, art. 6.
82. GATS, supra note 21, art. 9.
83. See, e.g., Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The Need for Integrating Trade and Competition
Rules in the WIO World Trade and Legal System, in THE LEGAL AND MORAL ASPECrS OF
INTERNATiONAL TRADE (Geraint Parry, et al., eds., 1998); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Inter-
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tion principles,84 or by means of a combination of both.85 Such
demands, however, cannot easily be justified on the basis that
the WTO has no competition rules. It is true, of course, that
there are only a few provisions in WTO law relating to private
restrictive business practices, such as on dumping, state trading
enterprises, and private monopolies under the GATT. WTO law,
therefore, does not yet provide a firm basis for an international
competition law and lacks the necessary institutional infrastruc-
ture.8 6
C. Staying on the Straight, Narrow, and Trusted WIO Course
It would seem premature, therefore, to rush into multilat-
eral negotiations without adequate preparation. That proposi-
tion may be underpinned by several considerations deriving
from the long-standing focus in GATT and WTO law and prac-
tice on governmental restraints and distortions of competition.
First, governmental market access barriers are of incomparably
greater importance than purely private RBPs. In addition, a sub-
stantial number of high tariffs and non-tariff barriers will remain
in place even after the full implementation of the Uruguay
Round, especially in areas of particular importance to DCs such
as agricultural trade, textiles and clothing, footwear, and leather
national Competition Rules for Governments and for Private Business: The Case for Linking
Future WTO Negotiations on Investment, Competition and Environmental Rules to Reforms of
Anti-Dumping Laws, 30 J. WORLD TRADE 5 (1996); WOLFGANG FiKENTSCHER & ULRICH
IMMENGA, DRAr INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST CODE (1995). For critical comment on the
Draft International Antitrust Code (the "Code"), see DanielJ. Gifford, TheDraft Interna-
tional Antitrust Code Proposed at Munich: Good Intentions Gone Awry, 6 MINN. J. GLOBAL
TRADE 1 (1997); Thomas J. Schoenbaum, The International Trade Laws and the New Protec-
tionism: The Needfor a Synthesis with Antitrust, 19 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 393 (1994);
and Wolfgang Fikentscher, Competition Rules for Private Agents in the GATTWTO System,
49 AUSSENWIRTSCHAFT 281-325 (1994).
84. See, e.g., Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, The International Dimension of Competition Pol-
icy, 17 FoRDHAM INT'L L.J. 833 (1994); Bernard Hoekman, Competition Policy and the
Global Trading System, 20 WORLD ECON. 383 (1997).
85. See, e.g., Eleanor M. Fox, Toward World Antitrust and Market Access, 91 AM. J.
INT'L L. 1, 23-24 (1997); see also Merit E. Janow, International Competition Policy, in THE
URUGUAY ROUND AND BEYOND: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF ARTHUR DUNKEL 279-91 (Jagdish
Bhagwati & Mathias Hirsch eds., 1998).
86. P.J. Lloyd, Multilateral Rules for International Competition Law?, 21 WORLD ECON.
1129, 1143 (1998). The prospects for negotiations on competition rules during the
"millennium" Round of trade negotiations, are assessed by P. Arhel, Droit International
de Concurrence, s'oriente-t-on vers des ndgociations?, 425 REVUE DU MARCHEk COMMUN 84
(1999).
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goods.8 7 Second, despite a decreasing importance of border bar-
riers relative to entry barriers behind the customs border, inter-
nal governmental market access barriers appear to be much
more important-e.g., regarding product standards, services,
trade, and commercial presence in the importing country-than
purely private restraints of competition.
Third, there are still many areas in which international
trade and competition continue to be impaired by discrimina-
tory governmental distortions. For example, discriminatory
rules of origin distort competition among like products and
competing suppliers. Other examples include discriminatory
government procurement practices, discriminatory anti-dump-
ing duties and price undertakings that restrict and distort com-
petition between foreign and domestic products and competi-
tors, and discriminatory state-trading practices and special privi-
leges granted by governments to domestic suppliers and trade
discriminations resulting from regional agreements. In all these
cases, it would appear that further liberalization and the
strengthening of the WTO non-discrimination requirements
would constitute a more effective means of reducing governmen-
tal distortions and promoting non-discriminatory competition.
Fourth, it is noteworthy that most WTO provisions on trade-
related competition problems already recognize members' sov-
ereign right to regulate and limit RBPs without prescribing obli-
gations for the adoption of substantive competition rules.88
Such a sensibly decentralized and flexible approach is justified
by the lack of economic consensus on optimal worldwide compe-
tition policy rules.89 By contrast, there has always been complete
and durable consensus among economists and governments on
the mutually beneficial welfare effects of further liberalization of
governmental trade barriers as envisaged under the traditional
GATT/WTO approach.
87. See Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement,
supra note 12, Annex IA (visited on Aug. 24, 1999) <http://www.wto.org/wto/legal/
finalact.htm> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal). In Article 1 (5) of the
WTO Agreement on Textiles and Clothing ("Textiles Agreement"), Members agree on
the need for "increased competition in their markets," but pursue this objective
through liberalization of governmental trade barriers. Id. art. 1(5).
88. See, e.g., GATS, supra note 21, art. 40; TRIPS, supra note 21; TRIMS, supra note
12.
89. JORGEN BASEDOW, SouvEPRAiNFT TERR1TORMLE ET GLOBALISATION DES MARCHP.S:
LE DOMAINE D'APPUCATION DES Lois CONTRE LEs RE~mCrnONS DE LA CONCURRENCE 164.
WORLD TRADE TO WORLD COMPETITION
Fifth, some WTO provisions explicitly refer to possible anti-
competitive effects of trade policy measures,90 while some others
also recognize that trade restrictions should be "in the public
interest."91 Such references to potential "interaction problems"
of trade and competition policies deserve priority attention,
given the consensus among economists that anti-dumping and
other safeguard measures reduce competition and economic
welfare for the benefit of rent-seeking lobbies.
The 1997 WTO Report takes the view that competition pol-
icy is needed even in conjunction with trade liberalization. But
nothing in that WTO Report militates against the validity of a
WTO approach in addressing competition issues. In fact, the
WTO Report concludes that "there is a strong presumption,
based on theoretical considerations, as well as practical experi-
ence, that trade liberalization in the form of reduced tariffs, the
elimination of QRs and so on, has pro-competitive effects."9 2
Considering, further, that there is little support for the idea of
harmonizing competition laws and policies, and no consensus,
politically and intellectually, on any but the most rudimentary of
specific international norms and that even supporters of multi-
lateral competition rules recognize the difficulties and pitfalls of
a long and difficult negotiating process ahead,93 it would seem
that there is yet some more mileage left in the "WTO approach."
CONCLUSION
The WTO has become the chosen forum for various trade-
related additional policies and provisions such as Trade Related
Environmental Measures ("TREMS"), TRIMS, TRIPS, and possi-
bly in the future, competition and investment rules. The TRIPS,
as is well known, owes its existence to trade-offs with DCs, which
have still not been fully implemented. Future additional poli-
cies, if controversial, would need to be justified separately on
economic grounds, or risk failure. Detailed multilateral compe-
tition rules will undoubtedly be adopted one day. I believe, how-
90. See, e.g., Anti-Dumping Agreement, supra note 67, § III, 5; Agreement on
Safeguards, supra note 77, § II, 1 11.
91. Agreement on Safeguards, supra note 77, § II, 3(a).
92. 1 WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, 1997 WTO ANNUAL REPORT, SPECIAL Topic:
TRADE AND COMPETITION Poucv 50 (1998).
93. See Hugo Paemen, Trade and Competition in the Transatlantic Area, 21 FoRDH"s
INT'L L.J. 637, 649 (1998); Krenzler, supra note 14, at 148.
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ever, that the time is not yet ripe for a comprehensive agree-
ment, except perhaps on the most abstract of principles. In the
meantime, it will be due to the very processes of regionalization
and globalization that enterprises will increasingly be subject to
national competition laws.94
In 1852, Alexis de Tocqueville observed that it is "unbeliev-
able how many systems of morals and politics have been succes-
sively found, forgotten, rediscovered, forgotten again, to reap-
pear a little later, always charming and surprising the world as if
they were new, and bearing witness, not to the fecundity of the
human spirit, but to the ignorance of men."95 Perhaps this can
be explained both by the world's indomitable will to achieve
something new, to make progress, and by an apparent proclivity
of ideologies, all ideologies, towards periodic collapse.9 6
The proclaimed end of the Cold War induced both an age
of uncertainty about basic goals and a shift in "world views" or
simply in "the mood of the time." It also prompted new enthusi-
asm for socioeconomic engineering aimed at changing the so-
cioeconomic and socioecological context of a more complex
and interdependent, international economic order. Yet, there is
some sense of dejd vu as far as the basic elements of a future
world competition order are concerned, namely globalization,
and attempts to establish multilateral competition rules. As one
prominent economist recently asked rhetorically: "Why do we
imagine that the global market is something new?" His own an-
swer was "because politics killed that first global market" since
"between 1914 and 1945 wars and protectionism tore up the
dense web of trade and investment."97 World competition con-
ferences in the 1920s likewise failed, as did later soft law codifica-
tions,98 and treaty projects,99 which, as Karl Meessen and Wolf-
94. Note the Commission Decision of July 17, 1996 authorizing the merger of
Ciba-Geigy and Sandoz to create a new company called Novartis, Ciba-Geigy/Sandoz,
E.U. BULL., no. 7/8, at 28, 1.3.44 (1996).
95. David S. Yost, Political Philosophy and the Theory of International Relations, 70 INT'L
AFFAiRs 263, 265 (1994).
96. ROBERT MUSIL, DAs HILFLOSE EUROPA 9, 26 (1961).
97. He also said that "world trade as a share of world production did not return to
its 1913 level until about 1970," and "is not much bigger now, as a share of world out-
put, than it was a century ago." See PAUL R. KRUGMAN, PoP INTERNATIONALIsM 208, 212
(1996); Alberto Tita, Globalization: A New Political and Economic Space Requiring Suprana-
tional Governance, 32 J. WORLD TRADE 47 (1998).
98. The U.N. Economic and Social Council abandoned a project of harmonizing
international antitrust rules in 1955, See Dale P. Furnish, A Transnational Approach to
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gang Fikentscher had already predicted in the 1980s,1"' trig-
gered an unquenchable thirst for more rules- Verrechtlichung-
amidst tendencies of deregulation.
Thus, from the evidence at hand to date, I have come to the
prudent and tentative conclusion that it would be premature as
yet to embark on major negotiations for multilateral standard
setting on world competition rules. My conclusion is based on
the following considerations:
First, the WTO approach, although an expanded continua-
tion of the GATT approach, is still fresh, largely untried, and
capable of development.
Second, to my mind, the Kodak-Fuji case does not constitute
a vindication of those who impatiently push for global competi-
tion rules. On the contrary, in the light of settled GATT panel
practice, it was, perhaps, a "bad case," which would probably not
normally have been brought, but for enterprising attorneys.
Third, unlike in the case of TRIPS, which is crafted around
provisions incorporated from pre-existing intellectual property
rights agreements, a multilateral competition agreement would
have no such pre-existing standards to fall back on.
Fourth, WTO Members and countries engaged in or con-
templating entering accession proceedings who do not currently
have competition laws on their books should first be encouraged
to adopt effective legislation and, even more importantly, to en-
force it.
Last, according to standard practice, international law rule
making normally requires a critical mass of state practice from
which to extract common principles, standards, or rules for codi-
fication. Indeed, international multilateral standard setting or
treaty making needs to be firmly based on relevant state practice
or risk failure, ineffectiveness, or just softness will follow.
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